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THE MANIFESTATION OF A MANUSCRIPT
SIGNATURE
We are familiar with the act of affixing amanuscript signature to a carrier, usually madeof paper. Such a signature is usually manifest as
being in a particular format, placed upon a document
(such as a passport, will, lease, contract) and affixed for a
purpose. However, rarely is anything simple when human
beings are involved with any action, and it can be of no
surprise that the format of a manuscript signature has been
the subject of judicial decision-making over the past 250
years. As a result, the following alternative forms of
manuscript signature have all been accepted in English
courts:
• the use of words other than a name;
• the use of a pseudonym and identifying phrases;
• the impression of a mark, such as a manuscript cross; and
• the use of a seal imprint, rubber stamp, facsimile
transmission and telex.
The case law illustrates the pragmatic approach of
succeeding judges, whose overriding consideration has
been to determine the function of the signature, and for
the legal consequences to flow from the function, rather
than permit the form a signature takes to affect its validity
at law.
THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
MANUSCRIPT SIGNATURES
There are invariably a number of risks associated with
the use of manuscript signatures, because manuscript
signatures are not necessarily reliable. Examples include
the variability of the signature, caused by factors such as the
onset of arthritis or old age; psychological causes, such as
stress; or the deliberate variation of a signature by a writer
to disguise their signature. Alternatively, a signature may be
obtained as a result of unconscionable conduct, fraud
instigated by a third party or undue influence by a third
party. A signature may also be forged.
The criminal courts deal with matters relating to forged
manuscript signatures on a regular basis. Quantifying how
often a manuscript signature is forged is more difficult,
although a recent study by the Cabinet Office in July 2002
(Identity fraud: a study) illustrated that the detection of
fraudulent applications in the public sector were quite low
in the year 2000–01. For instance, there were 1,484
fraudulent passport applications detected, representing
0.03 per cent of the total number of applications. In the
same period, there were 564 cases of identity fraud
identified by the Benefits Agency Security Investigation
Services, and it was estimated that between one and two
per cent of transaction value is lost through fraud in the
private sector.
THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
An electronic signature can be manifest if different
forms, such as the biodynamic version of a manuscript
signature; a manuscript signature that has been scanned;
the typing of a name on an electronic document; by
clicking the “I accept” button placed on a web site; and the
use of cryptography to affix a digital signature. The
fundamental difference between an electronic signature
and a manuscript signature relates to the control of the
signature by the user. A manuscript signature is under the
total physical control of the individual, whereas an
electronic signature will, in all probability, never be subject
to the same degree of control (with, perhaps, the exception
of mechanisms used by the military and government
agencies).
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A signature serves a number of purposes, the primary function being to provide admissible and
reliable evidence that the signatory approves and adopts the content of the document. In so
doing, the signatory agrees that the content of the document shall be binding upon them and
shall have legal effect, and further, the signatory is reminded of the significance of the act and
the need to act within the provisions of the document.
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The number of people involved in the chain of an
electronic signature indicates the weaknesses of control.
For instance, a digital signature can comprise three
elements – a key pair (a private key and a public key) and
a certificate, which is usually issued by a third party such as
a certification authority. A specialist key-generating
company may generate the private and public keys; a
registration authority may check the identity of the
individual or legal entity when an application is made for a
certificate, and the certification authority will issue a
certificate that acts as a link between the private key and
the user of the private key.
The security of the entire structure is, in essence,
predicated on ensuring the private key is kept secure,
usually by way of a password, or a mixture of password and
some other form of authentication, such as a smart card.
Either a manuscript signature is signed by the person
whose name the signature purports it to be, or it is forged.
By comparison, an electronic signature may theoretically
be used by any number of individuals for purposes other
than legitimate reasons.
SOME RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
In outline, the range of problems that might cause an
electronic signature (in particular, a digital signature) to be
the subject of unauthorized use include some of the
following noted below.
The properties of the computer system
There are hundreds of thousands of lines of computer
code, programmes have thousands of components, and
different types of software constantly interact with each
other. Unfortunately, systems have emergent properties
and do things that are not anticipated by users and
designers, and systems also have bugs that cause
misbehaviour and result in malfunctions that may not be
able to be replicated. The problem is, that the security of a
system is based on theory, whilst the real world is far more
complicated. An ideal secure system cannot be built, hence
there are compromises, such as design trade-offs, unseen
variables and imperfect implementation.
Electronic security relies wholly on prevention, generally
not the detection, response or auditing of a system. As a
result, the prevention strategy only works if prevention
mechanisms are perfect, otherwise somebody will manage
to circumvent the security.
Storage of the signature or private key
Where a private key is used to create a digital signature,
it first must be delivered to the user, then must be retained
safely by the user during its useful life. Thereafter, it must
be used, stored for as long as is necessary and then
destroyed at an appropriate time. If a scanned manuscript
signature is used, then the user must ensure the same
considerations apply to the electronic version of the
scanned signature – and consideration also needs to be
given to how to prevent the recipient from using or
misusing the scanned signature when in their possession.
Private keys and scanned signatures can be subject to
attack, either from within the organization or by a
malicious third party. Examples include an eavesdropper
that intercepts communications; the breaking of
passwords; the theft of a biometric measurement; the theft
or copying of tokens such as smart cards; and the inclusion
of a Trojan horse on a system that permits a third party to
gain access to a system to use a signature at a time of their
choosing. Sometimes a hacker will simply crack the
security system and replace crucial pieces of software with
code in the browser or signing tools to enable them to use
a certificate, if a certificate is used with a private key.
Using an electronic signature
Many problems relating to poor security arise from a
lack of understanding or training of end users. For
instance, where a user has set their security setting to
“High” they will have to enter their password every time
they wish to enter their private key to affix a digital
signature to a message. However, where their security
setting is set to the default, “Low”, the messages will be
automatically signed without any further intervention by
the use. This illustrates that any person with access to a
computer containing an electronic signature in a powered-
up state will be able to send messages with an electronic
signature affixed.
Another alternative is for the user to retain their private
key in memory during the login session, depending on how
many times a user intends signing messages during the day.
If a user keeps the private key in memory, it exposes the
key to being stolen. An example includes leaving the
computer unattended, thus permitting a third party to take
sufficient action to steal the key.
ASSESSING THE RISKS
In discussing the risks between manuscript and
electronic signatures, it is obvious that in both cases a
person can either sign a document with a manuscript
signature or with an electronic signature, and then
maintain that they did not cause the signature to be affixed
to the document. In theory, this will then leave the party
relying on the signature to prove the signature was affixed
by the signing party. However, governments across the
world have altered this burden in relation to electronic
signatures, and it is possible that the signing party may be
considered to have signed the electronic document where
an electronic signature has been used, although this issue is
not considered in this paper.
The overall risks between the two types of signature can
be simplified, as discussed below.12
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Using a signature without authority
Both a manuscript signature and an electronic signature
can be used without authority. Once a fraudster has
obtained a specimen of a manuscript signature, they can
try to replicate the signature. The person whose signature
is forged will not necessarily know their signature is being
used until after the event, although if a cheque book or
credit card has been stolen, the owner will be aware that
attempts might be made to forge their signature.
There is a vague possibility that a forged signature may
be noticed at the point of use, but is it unlikely. As for an
electronic signature, one such a signature has been taken,
the user may not be aware until well after the event. There
may be no physical evidence of loss, because digital copies
are so easily obtained. In the case of a scanned manuscript
signature, it is merely a matter of replicating the relevant
file. With a digital signature, access must be gained to the
private key, but this is not impossible, especially if retained
on a smart card. Whilst a digital signature, if accompanied
by a certificate, has an expiry date, nevertheless an
unauthorized party will not loose any time in using the
device for their own purposes well before the certificate
expires.
Who is responsible
The forgery of a manuscript signature does not expose
the person whose signature has been forged to any liability.
However, the law is far from certain in relation to the use
of electronic signatures, because it appears that a reversal
of the burden of proof, and the provision of presumptions
in legislation, may mean the person with an electronic
signature may find themselves liable, depending on the
facts. If this is the case, the party utilizing an electronic
signature may well have to consider the risks attendant
upon the use of such a device. This will be particularly
important in relation to electronic conveyancing.
Assessing the risk
In assessing the nature of the risk, several factors can be
taken into account. First, who bears the risk? Banks, if they
are not required by legislation to shoulder risk, will allocate
the risk to other parties. Thus the risk with credit cards
tends to be with the merchant. Until recently, credit card
providers required the user to authenticate the debit of
their account with a manuscript signature. However, since
the introduction of cards with a personal identification
number (PIN) in France and other European countries,
the United Kingdom and USA are reluctantly following
this example.
Whilst the use of a PIN number is not a signature (it is
merely a shared secret between the card issuer and the
recipient), nevertheless the use of a PIN can reduce the
risk associated with the card. The economics relating to
credit cards and debit cards using a manuscript signature
and those using a PIN are of interest. Retailers in the USA
took legal action against the credit card issuers in an
attempt to stop them from charging high rates for
processing cards using manuscript signatures to authorise a
transaction. Apparently, merchants paid issuers of Visa and
Mastercard US$4.67bn for transactions that were
processed with manuscript signatures, compared to
US$715.3m paid to banks that issued PIN based cards.
The difference in charges is so significant that it is
understandable the retailers decided to take action to
rectify this position.
Another issue to consider is the degree of risk. With low
value transactions, it can make sense to rely on a shared
secret such as a PIN, between the card issuer and the
customer. However, where a high value transaction is being
negotiated, it may be wise to rely on manuscript signatures
to sign a contract, rather than electronic signatures. The
cost of the security to ensure that the electronic signature
is not compromised will be far greater than the cost of
printing a document in duplicate and requiring both
parties to sign and countersign the relevant agreement
using a writing instrument.
The risks will depend on the consequences faced by the
parties and how the relationship between the two is
governed in law. At present, it can be argued that the move
towards electronic signatures is rapidly altering the burden
of proof in relation to the signature. The British
government has already passed a number of statutory
instruments that have, effectively, reversed the burden of
proof in relation to the use of electronic signatures.
There is no question that the government, which is in a
far better position to pay for and institute a proper means
of authentication, is placing a very onerous burden on
subjects, should the subject decide to interact with
government online. It will be mandatory for all
organizations to submit their tax affairs to the Inland
Revenue by 2010, yet many thousands of organizations will
have no concept of the risks they face when submitting to
such a regime, and will not be in a position to afford the
costs of providing for proper security of their electronic
signatures. One thing is certain: we can expect to see many
problems over this issue in the future.
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